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HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND COOPERATIVE 
FEDERALISM: INJECTING REALITY INTO POLICY 
FORMATION 
Gianna Cricco-Lizza∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Energy independence and the importance of domestic sources 
of energy are pressing concerns in today’s global political environ-
ment.
1
  Shale gas development increasingly relies on hydraulic frac-
turing to stimulate production as domestic natural gas resources are 
depleted.
2
  Hydraulic fracturing is a method of increasing the volume 
of coal-bed methane gas extracted from high-density sources.
3
  Envi-
ronmental organizations have raised serious concerns regarding 
states’ diverse regulatory schemes and whether the federal govern-
ment should provide uniform standards.
4
  The Environmental Protec-
 
 ∗ J.D., May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Columbia 
University.  I want to express deep gratitude to Professor Marc Poirier for his excel-
lent guidance and breadth of knowledge regarding all aspects of environmental law, 
to Brigitte Radigan for her supervision and valuable editing, and to my family, Evan 
Haggerty, and my friends for their comments and assistance.  
 1 See INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, RESOLUTION 09.102: SUPPORTING 
HYDROCARBON EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE COASTAL PLAIN OF ANWR AS 
PART OF THE NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY (2009) (noting that importing sixty percent of 
oil that the United States needs costs more than $400 billion every year, without con-
sidering the costs of providing military protection to that  oil supply). 
 2 See INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, RESOLUTION 09.106: SUPPORTING 
CONTINUED ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF SHALE GAS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2009) (noting that “domestic production of natural gas is expected 
to increase as a share of U.S. supply from 84 percent in 2007 to 97 percent in 2030,” 
with shale gas formations gaining prominence as the fastest growing source within 
the same timeframe); ANDREW BRADFORD, BENTEK ENERGY, MARCELLUS SHALE & 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NORTHEAST 13 (2010) (indicating that Pennsylvania’s active rig 
count—including directional, vertical, and horizontal wells—increased from forty in 
April 2009 to 115 in April 2010), available at 
http://www.narucmeetings.org/Presentations/BENTEK_Market_Update__MACRU
C_100629.pdf. 
 3 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OPPORTUNITY FOR STAKEHOLDER INPUT ON EPA’S 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING RESEARCH STUDY: STUDY DESIGN 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/hydrofrac_landscapemodel.pdf. 
 4 See infra notes 39–46 and accompanying text. 
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tion Agency’s (EPA) future role in regulation of this process is un-
clear. 
This Comment argues that a model of modified cooperative fed-
eralism should be applied to the controversy surrounding the EPA’s 
regulation of hydraulic fracturing.  A  relationship of this nature—
one in which the federal government agency produces a simple, final 
scientific answer to calm individual fears of new technology but leaves 
regulation to local governments—will provide more comprehensive, 
protective, and accountable regulation of the industry, while preserv-
ing some balance between the competing environmental and indus-
trial interests.  Part II discusses background information regarding 
the mechanical process of hydraulic fracturing.  Part III focuses on 
already implemented state solutions in addition to issues arising in 
states overlaying the Marcellus Shale.  Part III also briefly identifies 
which federal statutes regulate parts of the hydraulic fracturing pro-
cess and which gaps the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of 
Chemicals Act (“FRAC Act”) is intended to fill.  Part III additionally 
surveys science and policy related to the EPA’s regulation of this area, 
particularly the precautionary principle, and analyzes a previous study 
of hydraulic fracturing.  Part IV presents the concept of cooperative 
federalism and an illustration of how lack of designated authority has 
resulted in a catastrophic breakdown where federal and state powers 
overlap.  Part V analyzes how to apply cooperative federalism to the 
controversy surrounding the EPA’s regulation of hydraulic fracturing.  
Finally, Part VI summarizes the reasons why such a model should pre-
vail in a situation where competing, highly valued interests must be 
balanced. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Geology of the Marcellus Shale 
For the past sixty years,
5
 commercial use of hydraulic fracturing 
has helped exploration and development companies access uncon-
 
 5 “The first commercial application of hydraulic fracturing as a well treatment 
technology designed to stimulate the production of oil or gas likely occurred in ei-
ther the Hugoton field of Kansas in 1946 or near Duncan Oklahoma in 1949.”  
GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS 
REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 21 (2009), available at 
http://www.gwpc.org/elibrary/documents/general/State%20Oil%20and%20Gas%2
0Regulations%20Designed%20to%20Protect%20Water%20Resources.pdf.   
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ventional
6
 sources of methane gas and has stimulated production in 
subsiding wells.
7
  Recent utilization of the procedure has increased 
access to methane gas in shale plays, which are discoveries of gas or 
oil within geological formations of sufficient size to be worth subse-
quent exploration and development.
8
  In Texas, development of the 
Barnett Shale began in Fort Worth during the 1980s.
9
  Subsequent 
exploration has drawn industry attention to the natural resources 
waiting 4,000 feet under the earth’s surface in the Marcellus Shale.
10
  
This shale play stretches from New York to Virginia.
11
 
The Marcellus Shale consists of Middle Devonian-age black, low-
density, organically rich shale
12
 with an average depth to its top rang-
ing from a mile in southwestern Pennsylvania
13
 to 6,000 feet in south-
 
 6 “[U]nconventional . . .  , for the non-specialist, means that it is challenging to 
lift this oil [or gas] out of the ground.”  Dave Cohen, An Unconventional Play in the 
Bakken, ENERGY BULL. (Apr. 16, 2008, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.energybulletin.net/print/42850.  
 7 See STUART KEMP, HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVS., INC., COMMENTS OF 
HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC. 6–7 (2010); see also JOSEPH H. FRANTZ, JR. & 
VALERIE JOCHEN, SCHLUMBERGER MKTG. COMMC’NS, SHALE GAS  4 (2005), available at 
http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2010/ph240/alnoaimi2/docs/shale_gas_solutio
n_05of299.pdf. 
Early low-permeability horizontal wells were considered failures be-
cause they did not naturally produce at commercial rates.  The explo-
sive growth of horizontal wells in shales is due to improvements in 
completion technologies.  Multistage stimulation treatments are now 
performed on these wells to place hydraulic fractures around the 
borehole.  The ability to economically perforate, stimulate, and isolate 
multiple points along the lateral has made these wells commercial suc-
cesses. 
Id.  
 8 Nolan Hart, What Is a Shale Gas Play?, EAGLE FORD SHALE BLOG (Mar. 3, 2010, 
9:47 AM), http://eaglefordshaleblog.com/2010/03/03/what-is-a-shale-gas-play/. 
 9 J. DANIEL ARTHUR ET AL., ALL CONSULTING, LLC, EVALUATING THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN SHALE GAS RESERVES 2 
(2008), available at http://www.all-
llc.com/publicdownloads/ArthurHydrFracPaperFINAL.pdf. 
 10 Id. at 5 Exhibit 3; see also TIMOTHY CONSIDINE ET AL., PA. STATE UNIV., AN 
EMERGING GIANT: PROSPECTS & ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DEVELOPING THE MARCELLUS 
SHALE NATURAL GAS PLAY 6 (2009) (noting that the average depth of shale gas in the 
Marcellus Shale is one mile), available at 
http://alleghenyconference.org/PDFs/PELMisc/PSUStudyMarcellusShale072409.P
DF. 
 11 CONSIDINE, supra note 10, at 2. 
 12 Id. at 4. 
 13 Id. at 6. 
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eastern New York and 1,000 feet in the middle of New York.
14
  With 
thickness of fifty feet to 200 feet, the shale “covers an area of 95,000 
square miles.”
15
  While the shale has a lower gas content than some 
other domestic plays,
16
 the estimated basin area is more than double 
the size of the next largest
17
 in New Albany (43,500 square miles),
18
 
and almost ten times the size of the other five domestic plays: Barnett 
(5000 square miles),
19
 Fayetteville (9000 square miles),
20
 Haynesville 
(9000 square miles),
21
 Woodford (11,000 square miles),
22
 and Antrim 
(12,000 square miles).
23
  In summary, the Marcellus Shale represents 
a conveniently placed, extensive source of natural gas. 
 
 14 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, AND SOLUTION MINING 
REGULATORY PROGRAM 4-19 (2009), available at 
ftp://ftp.dec.state.ny.us/dmn/download/OGdSGEISFull.pdf. 
 15 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 
A PRIMER 21 (2009), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-
gas/publications/epreports/shale_gas_primer_2009.pdf.  
 16 ARTHUR, supra note 9, at 5 Exhibit 3.  
As recently as 2002 the United States Geological Survey in its “Assess-
ment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Appalachian Basin 
Province,” calculated that the Marcellus Shale contained an estimated 
undiscovered resource of about 1.9 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of gas.  
Just five years later, Engelder (2009) estimates 2,445 trillion cubic feet 
of reserves in place with recoverable reserves amounting to 489 trillion 
cubic feet. 
CONSIDINE, supra note 10, at 4. 
 17 ARTHUR, supra note 9, at 2 Exhibit 1 (delineating on a map where shales exist: 
“Gas Shale Basins of the United States with Estimated Gas Reserves”); id. at 5 Exhibit 
3 (comparing various measurements of size and quality of reserves: “Comparison of 
Data for the Gas Shales in the United States”); id. at 6 Exhibit 4 (matching period, 
shale formation, and location: “Stratigraphy of the U.S. Gas Shales”).  The Marcellus 
Shale extends for 95,000 square miles, while the next largest shale is merely 43,500 
square miles.  Id. at 5 Exhibit 3. 
 18 Id. at 5 Exhibit 3.  The New Albany Shale is located under Illinois and Indiana 
and the northwestern border of Kentucky, id. at 6 Exhibit 4, holding an estimated 
19.2 Tcf (trillion cubic feet) in gas reserves, id. at 2 Exhibit 1. 
 19 Id. at 5 Exhibit 3.  The Barnett Shale is located beneath Texas, id. at 6 Exhibit 
4, holding estimated reserves of 44 Tcf,  id. at 5 Exhibit 3 . 
 20 Id. at 5 Exhibit 3.  The Fayetteville Shale is under Arkansas, id. at 6 Exhibit 4, 
holding estimated reserves of 42 Tcf,  id. at 5 Exhibit 3. 
 21 Id. at 5 Exhibit 3.  The Haynesville/Bossier Shale is under Texas and Louisi-
ana, id. at 6 Exhibit 4, and holds reserves of approximately 264 Tcf  id. at 5 Exhibit 3. 
 22 Id. at 5 Exhibit 3.  The Woodford Shale is in both Texas and Oklahoma, id. at 6 
Exhibit 4, with reserves of 11 Tcf,  id. at 5 Exhibit 3. 
 23 ARTHUR, supra note 9, at 5 Exhibit 3.  Antrim, beneath Michigan, id. at 6 Exhib-
it 4, holds reserves between 35 and 76 Tcf,  id. at 5 Exhibit 3. 
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B. Political and Economic Background to the Marcellus Shale’s 
Development 
Development of the Marcellus Shale presents the opportunity to 
create jobs,
24
 encourage reliance on domestic natural resources,
25
 and 
smoothly assist the transition from fossil fuels to greener sources of 
energy.
26
  Natural gas extraction is important because of the potential 
to use natural gas as a “bridge fuel”
27
 that will encourage the transi-
tion from traditional sources of energy to more renewable, greener 
sources.
28
  Shale gas is projected to amount to fifty percent of the U.S. 
natural gas supply by 2035, up from twenty percent today and one 
percent in 2000.
29
 
Market forces impacting natural gas production in the Marcellus 
Shale operate at local, state, national, and global levels.
30
  Additional-
ly, coal-fired electric power presents powerful competition in the 
 
 24 CONSIDINE, supra note 10, at 17–18.  The study estimates that total spending by 
Marcellus Shale producers was $3.09 billion in 2008, $66 million of which on payroll 
alone.  Id. at 21–22. 
 25 Id. at 10, 32–33.  “[W]ithin a 200-mile radius of the Marcellus, there is an exist-
ing and potential market of over 18 BCF per day.”  Id. at 10. 
 26 James M. Tour et al., Green Carbon as a Bridge to Renewable Energy, 9 NATURE 
MATERIALS 871, 871 (Oct. 22, 2010) (“The typical value of greenhouse gas emission 
for natural gas is about half that of coal, or half as much CO2 per kilowatt hour.  
Moreover, there is enough recoverable natural gas in shale deposits (shale gas) to 
meet the world’s energy needs for the next 60 years.” (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted)); INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, RESOLUTION 09.106: SUPPORTING 
CONTINUED ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF SHALE GAS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2009).  “[D]omestic production of natural gas is expected to in-
crease as a share of U.S. supply from 84 percent in 2007 to 97 percent in 2030” and 
natural gas currently comprises twenty-three percent of the United States’ energy 
supply.  Id. 
 27 See Tour et al., supra note 26, at 871.  The article identifies the three elements 
most abundant on Earth with “the capacity to store and produce enough energy to 
power our civilization”: carbon, non-fissile uranium-238, and hydrogen.  Id. at 872.  
Because the current infrastructure is geared to carbon, however, the authors suggest 
that a green carbon movement towards a hydrogen-based future would best serve 
long-term national energy needs.  Id. at 874. 
 28 Id.; see also INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, RESOLUTION 09.101: 
URGING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF OIL & GAS RESEARCH 
AND TO ADEQUATELY FUND OIL & GAS RESEARCH INITIATIVES (2009) (proposing that 
repeal of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 would result in a substantial reduction of 
funding necessary to ensure that “American consumers have clean, reliable, and af-
fordable supplies of oil and natural gas”). 
 29 IHS CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOCS., FUELING NORTH AMERICA’S ENERGY 
FUTURE: THE UNCONVENTIONAL NATURAL GAS REVOLUTION & THE CARBON AGENDA, at  
ES-1 (2010), available at http://www2.cera.com/docs/Executive_Summary.pdf. 
 30 CONSIDINE, supra note 10, at 7 fig.2.  Natural gas prices are still recovering from 
the summer of 2008.  Id. 
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market, with natural gas only recently gaining an edge through lower 
capital costs and strategic environmental considerations.
31
  Wide-
spread use of hydraulic fracturing has led to a surge in interest in 
shales across the United States. 
32
  The Marcellus Shale is uniquely 
situated as compared to other sources of natural gas due to its prox-
imity to major cities on the eastern seaboard.
33
  Pennsylvania and five 
surrounding states engage in “current natural gas consumption [of] 
9.5 BCF [billion cubic feet] per day.”
34
 
Additionally, this particular market relies on a similar level of 
electric power derived from coal combustion, which yields a potential 
market of at least eighteen BCF of natural gas per day.
35
  The shale’s 
development implicates large sums of money both in the present and 
the near future.  In 2008, the shale’s development in Pennsylvania 
alone generated $2.3 billion in total value added, as well as 29,000 
jobs and $240 million in state and local taxes.
36
  The pace of devel-
opment in the shale is rapidly transforming from the testing and 
evaluation stage into full commercial production.
37
 
Some groups oppose development, including some citizens who 
have previously leased land to oil companies for drilling, while other 
citizens with land that could be leased are in favor of the practice of 
hydraulic fracturing.
38
  Opponents argue that the wells were unobtru-
 
 31 Id. at 7–10. 
 32 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 25. 
 33 Id. at 25; Marcellus Shale—Appalachian Basin Natural Gas Play, GEOLOGY.COM 
(Oct. 30, 2009), http://geology.com/articles/marcellus-shale.shtml.  
 34 TIMOTHY CONSIDINE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW YORK, PENNSYLVANIA, & WEST VIRGINIA 11 (2010), available at 
http://www.api.org/policy/exploration/hydraulicfracturing/upload/API_Economic
_Impacts_Marcellus_Shale.pdf.  “[A]bundant supplies of natural gas would enable 
electricity producers to cost effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions because 
natural gas has considerably less carbon content than coal and oil.”  Id. at iv.  
 35 CONSIDINE, supra note 10, at 10.   
There is also a considerable amount of coal-fired electric power gener-
ation in this region.  In the unlikely event that all of this capacity was 
converted to natural gas, an additional 9 BCF per day of natural gas 
would be required.  So within a 200-mile radius of the Marcellus, there 
is an existing and potential market of over 18 BCF per day.   
Id. 
 36 Id. at ii. 
 37 The pace of development of the shale resulted in such a dramatic increase in 
economic output that estimated total value added to Pennsylvania for 2009 doubled, 
while state and local taxes were predicted to increase to $400 million and total job 
creation of 48,000.  Id. 
 38 See infra notes 39–41, 43. 
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sive, lucrative ways to use rights that were purchased when the home-
owners bought the land.
39
  Other people point to neighboring states 
and either desire to follow the same lucrative paths
40
 or avoid suffer-
ing the lessons that citizens and leaders of other states have learned 
through great pain and damage.
41
  Other citizens are fearful of the 
dangerous consequences of hydrofracking—a few share fearful, bitter 
stories of blighted or depleted water supply after companies hydro-
fracked
42
 coalbed methane (CBM) wells.
43
 
There are several public environmental concerns associated with 
the process of hydraulic fracturing.  The first issue is anecdotal evi-
dence of changes in water quality (so-called introduction issues) and 
quantity (so-called reduction issues) following the commencement of 
fracking operations in communities.
44
  Another source of concern 
stems from personal stories of contaminated well water, dead farm 
animals, and impaired human health.
45
  Environmental activists have 
pointed to citizens’ experiences that are redolent with misinfor-
 
 39 See Siobhan Hughes, New York Congressman’s Lead Slips as Gas-Drilling Fight Heats 
Up, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20101021-
720593.html.  
 40 E.g., Andrew Maykuth, Strong Positions on Either Side of “Fracking” at EPA Hearing, 
PHILLY.COM (Sept. 14, 2010), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/special_packages/inquirer/marcellus-
shale/20100914_Strong_positions_on_either_side_of__quot_fracking_quot__at_EPA
_hearing.html.  “[L]and owners such as Chris Ostrowsky expressed exasperation that 
Pennsylvanians a few miles away in Susquehanna County were striking it rich while 
New Yorkers were in limbo . . . .  ‘It’s real frustrating to see what’s going on across the 
border, how the economy is booming in Pennsylvania,’ Ostrowsky said.”  Id. 
 41 E.g., Abrahm Lustgarten, Reporter’s Notebook: Hydraulic Fracturing, YOUTUBE (Jan. 
21, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yy556ACxJ2I.  
 42 Hydraulic fracturing is also known as “hydrofracking,” “fracking,” “frac’ing,” 
and many other informal terms. 
 43 E.g., Mireya Navarro, Signing Drilling Leases, and Now Having Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 22, 2011, at A25; Katie Benner & Shelley DuBois, Odorless, Colorless: the Quiet Rise 
of American Big Gas, FORTUNE (Oct. 1, 2010, 3:54 PM ET), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/29/news/companies/fracking_natural_gas_indust
ry.fortune/index.htm; Louis Meeks, Gas Drilling Has Blighted My Life: We Need Energy 
But Not at the Cost of Clean Water, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 12, 2010), 
http://www.hcn.org/wotr/gas-drilling-has-blighted-my-life .  
 44 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 1–2 (noting the potential contamination 
of underground sources of drinking water (USDWs) or surface water through hy-
draulic fracturing processes and the impact on water quantity through the large vol-
ume of water used—each well could potentially use between two to five million gal-
lons of water in drilling and hydrofracking the well). 
 45 Don Hopey, 1,200 Hear Marcellus Shale Debate EPA Hearing in Canonsburg One of 
Four Nationwide, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 23, 2010, at A1 (“[Pennsylvania resi-
dents] attributed the problems to water contamination caused by the deep gas drill-
ing operations that are increasing quickly through much of the state.”). 
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mation concerning regulation and unsubstantiated incidents of water 
contamination.
46
  This fear stems from a lack of public knowledge 
concerning the components of the fracking fluid.
47
 
On June 9, 2009, U.S. Senators Robert P. Casey Jr. (D-PA) and 
Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) and Representatives Diana DeGette (D-
CO), Maurice Hinchey (D-NY), and Jared Polis (D-CO) introduced 
two companion bills dubbed the FRAC Act.
48
  The bills called for the 
EPA to obtain jurisdiction over hydraulic fracturing under the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
49
 and for companies engaging in hy-
draulic fracturing to provide certain disclosures regarding the chemi-
cals used in the process.
50
  In 2010, the 111th Congress asked the EPA 
to produce a study determining the risks to groundwater associated 
with hydraulic fracturing, with anticipated results available in 2014.
51
 
Industry officials have welcomed the EPA’s decision to study the 
complex relationship between hydraulic fracturing and drinking wa-
ter to learn more about possible impacts hydraulic fracturing may 
have on such a vital natural resource.
52
  Industry leaders, however, 
fear that the study will preclude current development and have ar-
gued for a focused study that will present a final conclusive answer on 
whether the EPA should be involved in regulation of hydraulic frac-
 
 46 Tom Zeller, Jr., EPA to Study Chemicals Used to Tap Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
9, 2010, at B3. 
 47 Hopey, supra note 45. 
 48 S. 1215, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. (2009); Abraham 
Lustgarten, FRAC Act—Congress Introduces Twin Bills to Control Drilling and Protect 
Drinking Water, PROPUBLICA (June 9, 2009, 1:31 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/frac-act-congress-introduces-bills-to-control-
drilling-609. 
 49 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (2006). 
 50 S. 1215; H.R. 2766. 
 51 Zeller, supra note 46; Jim Efstathiou, New Yorkers Spar over U.S. EPA Study of Nat-
ural-Gas Fracturing, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2010, 12:00 AM  ET), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-13/new-york-gas-drilling-conflict-aired-
over-u-s-fracturing-study.html.   
The EPA’s new study “needs to be carried out with the utmost care to 
identify the full range of risks,” said Kate Sinding, senior attorney with 
the New York-based Natural Resources Defense Council, an environ-
mental organization.  “It is no exaggeration to say all eyes, both in the 
United States and around the world, are on EPA.”   
Id. 
 52 STUART KEMP, HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVS., INC., COMMENTS OF HALLIBURTON 
ENERGY SERVICES, INC. 2 (2010), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/D94C67ADFAC802C38525773E0064F
1AA/$File/Comments+of+Halliburton+Energy+Services+Inc+on+Hydraulic+Fracturi
ng+6-9-10.pdf. 
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turing.
53
  A fear persists among industry insiders
54
 and consumers
55
 
that federal intrusion into the current state regulatory schemes will 
drive up prices and deter the gas industry from investing in produc-
tion of this natural resource.
56
 
The bills introduced in the Senate and House of Representatives 
seek to address these concerns through two mechanisms: first, 
through amendment of the SDWA to remove the explicit exemption
57
 
of hydraulic fracturing from the EPA’s jurisdiction
58
 and second, by 
requiring companies that use hydraulic fracturing to make public 
and emergency disclosures of the additives injected into the wells in 
 
 53 KEMP, supra note 52, at 2; INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, supra note 
2. 
 54 INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, RESOLUTION 09.011: SUPPORTING 
CONTINUED ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF SHALE GAS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2009).  
Hydraulic fracturing plays a major role in the development of virtually 
all unconventional oil and gas resources and, thus, should not be lim-
ited in the absence of any evidence that such fracturing has damaged 
the environment . . . . Regulation of hydraulic fracturing as under-
ground injection under the SDWA would impose significant adminis-
trative costs on the state and substantially increase the cost of drilling 
oil and gas wells with no resulting environmental benefits.  
Id.  Attached to Resolution 09.011 were the resolutions passed by Alaska (S.J.R. 14), 
Alabama (H.J.R. 254), Louisiana (H.C.R. 38), Mississippi (S.C. 636), North Dakota 
(S.C.R. 4020), Oklahoma (H.C.R. 1012), Utah (S.J.R. 17), Texas (H.C.R. 67), and 
Wyoming (S.J. 0005).  
 55 Maykuth, supra note 39.  “Broome  County Executive Barbara Fiala declared 
fracking ‘safe’ and expressed frustration with the slow pace of development in New 
York. ‘All we ask is that this study be focused and not take forever to complete,’ she 
said [at the EPA shareholder meeting in Binghamton, N.Y. in September 2010].”  Id. 
 56 INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, supra note 54. 
 57 The FRAC Act aims to lift exemption of hydraulic fracturing from the Safe 
Drinking Water Act imposed by the Environmental Policy Act of 2005.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300h (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594, 694 (2005).  The 
exemption was enacted following extensive lobbying by the oil and gas industry for 
Congress to provide clarification about whether the EPA was required to regulate 
hydraulic fracturing under state UIC programs.  See Part III.C.1, infra; see also Hannah 
Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil & Gas Production and 
the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 167 (2009).  Professor 
Wiseman provides a comprehensive discussion of this history in Part V. Regulatory 
Problems and the Need for Reform.  Id. 
 58 Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act, S. 1215, 111th 
Cong. § 2 (2009); Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2009, 
H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).  The Senate bill was reintroduced by Sen. Robert 
Casey (D-PA), who sponsored the bill along with co-sponsors Benjamin Cardin (D-
MD), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Frank Lautenberg (D-
NJ), Bernard Sanders (I-VT), Charles Schumer (D-NY), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-
RI).  S. 587, 112th Cong. (2011). Rep. Diana DeGette reintroduced the bill in the 
House, along with thirty-seven co-sponsors.  H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. (2011).   
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the mix used to fracture the coal beds.
59
  Congress did not pass the 
bills in the 111th Congress, nor has it passed them in the 112th Con-
gress to date.
60
 
III. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
A. The Mechanical Process of Hydraulic Fracturing 
Hydraulic fracturing,
61
 combined with the recent advent of hori-
zontal drilling,
62
 has resulted in unprecedented potential to access 
sources of methane gas that were previously too difficult to extract,
63
 
in terms of profit on investment.
64
  The mechanical process of hy-
draulic fracturing uses fluid pressure to fracture the material sur-
rounding the drill shaft.
65
  Operators inject fluids into vertical or hor-
izontal wells at high pressure to generate fractures or exacerbate 
existing fractures in the formation.
66
  The fluids largely consist of wa-
 
 59 FRAC Act, S. 587, 112th Cong. § 2.  
 60 For the current status of these bills, see GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtr 
ack.us/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).  The bills may not be passed due to political im-
practicality; for instance, New York Congressman Hinchey faced a tight election as 
his constituents began to appreciate the economic consequences of the moratorium 
imposed by New York Department of Environmental Conservation following his push 
for a study of hydraulic fracturing by the EPA.  Hughes, supra note 39. 
 61 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 13 (“Large scale hydraulic fracturing, a 
process first developed in Texas in the 1950s, was first used in the Barnett in 1986; 
likewise, the first Barnett horizontal well was drilled in 1992.” (citing JEFF HAYDEN & 
DAVE PURSELL, PICKERING ENERGY, INC., THE BARNETT SHALE—VISITOR’S GUIDE TO THE 
HOTTEST GAS PLAY IN THE US (2005)). 
 62 John A. Harper, The Marcellus Shale—An Old “New” Gas Reservoir in Pennsylvania, 
38 PA. GEOLOGY 2, 10 (2008).  Horizontal drilling consists of drilling vertically until 
the drill bit is at a specific height from the desired horizontal resource (the “kickoff 
point”) at which point the drill is directed in an arc ending within the layer of mate-
rial.  See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 52 Exhibit 30.  The drill then moves 
forward, now drilling parallel to the surface.  See id. 
 63 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 13 (“The combination of sequenced 
hydraulic fracture treatments and horizontal well completions has been crucial in 
facilitating expansion of shale gas development.  Prior to the successful application 
of these two technologies in the Barnett Shale, shale gas resources in many basins 
had been overlooked because production was not viewed as economically feasible.” 
(citing Harper, supra note 62)). 
 64 Id. at 14 (“The combination of reduced economics and low permeability of gas 
shale formations historically caused operators to bypass these formations and focus 
on other resources.”  (citing M. Airhart, The Barnett Shale Gas Boom: Igniting a Hunt for 
Unconventional Natural Gas Resources, GEOLOGY.COM, 
http://geology.com/research/barnett-shale-gas.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2012))). 
 65 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 1. 
 66 Id. 
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ter with a small proportion of additives, which increase fluidity or 
prevent contamination, and sand or some other proppant,
67
 which 
keeps the fractures open and permits the gas to flow to the surface 
freely.
68
 
The process of hydraulic fracturing begins with the construction 
of a well pad, from which all subsequent operations are conducted.
69
  
Construction can take up to a month, following which the vertical 
well shaft is drilled with a smaller rig.
70
  A larger rig is brought onsite 
for the horizontal drilling, which also takes up to two weeks per well, 
though more than one well may be drilled simultaneously.
71
  To pre-
pare the well for fracturing, it is lined with casing that serves to pre-
vent fluids from escaping into the environment except where the op-
erator directs them.
72
  “Current well construction requirements 
consist of installing multiple layers of protective steel casing and ce-
ment that are specifically designed and installed to protect fresh wa-
ter aquifers and to ensure that the producing zone is isolated from 
overlying formations.”
73
  The layered system of casings sealed with 
cement is tested at several steps during the process to ensure that 
“the casing used has sufficient strength, and that the cement has 
properly bonded to the casing.”
74
  Preparation for the hydraulic frac-
ture takes between one and two months, depending on the time 
when the necessary equipment arrives.
75
  Coordinating the availability 
of temporary tanks to store the water and the transportation of frac-
turing (“frac”) fluid, water, sand, and other equipment, including 
computerized monitoring instruments, is essential.
76
  The process of 
fracturing the well requires two to five days, “including approximately 
40 to 100 hours of actual pumping.”
77
  Fluid return occurs over the 
 
 67 A proppant, usually a silica sand mix, serves to maintain the fractures in the 
shale formation which were created through hydraulic pressure by “propping” them 
open with a solid piece of material. See CONSIDINE, supra note 10, at 5. 
 68 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 1; N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 5-42.  
 69 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 5-124, tbl.5.15. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 51–52. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 52. 
 75 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 5-124, tbl.5.15.  
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
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following two to eight weeks,
78
 with the volume of flowback fluid ac-
counting for thirty to seventy percent of the original fracture fluid.
79
 
These activities are subject to extensive state and federal regula-
tion, some of which are discussed below,
80
 as well as current industry 
practices, which have been described elsewhere.
81
 
B. State Control 
Comprehensive state and local laws manage the process of pro-
ducing oil and gas from exploration to delivery.
82
  Individual assess-
ments of “geology, hydrology, climate, topography, industry charac-
teristics, development history, state legal structures, population 
density, and local economics” are appropriate and often form the ba-
sis for current regulatory schemes.
83
  For instance, the wastewater 
generated at wells employing hydraulic fracturing can be injected 
deep underground into natural depositories, such as the depositories 
in the Barnett Shale in Texas
84
 or in the Fayetteville Shale in Arkan-
sas.
85
  While this solution for water management is uniquely suited to 
such geological formations,
86
 it may be utterly impracticable for a 
state where the underlying geological formations would not be con-
ducive to such disposal methods. 
87
 
 
 78 Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 66 (citing J. SATTERFIELD,  
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP., MANAGING WATER RESOURCE’S CHALLENGES IN SELECT 
NATURAL GAS SHALE PLAYS (2008)). 
 79 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 66 (citing “[p]ersonal communication 
with numerous operators and service companies in a variety of shale gas plays”). 
 80 For an overview of state statutes governing the disposal of produced fluid, see 
infra Part III.B.1.  For a description/overview of federal statutes currently addressing 
disposal of flowback fluid, see infra Part III.C.1. 
 81 For a detailed discussion of the industry’s current practices of managing pro-
duced fluid, see U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 66–70. 
 82 Id. at 25. 
 83 Id. 
 84 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 69 Exhibit 39. 
 85 Adam J. Bailey, Comment, The Fayetteville Shale Play and the Need to Rethink Envi-
ronmental Regulation of Oil and Gas Development in Arkansas, 63 ARK. L. REV. 815, 821–
22 (2010). 
 86 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(3)(A) (2006) (“The regulations of the Administrator 
under this section shall permit or provide for consideration of varying geologic, hy-
drological, or historical conditions in different States and in different areas within a 
State.”). 
 87 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 69. “Underground injection of the 
produced water is not possible in every play as suitable injection zones may not be 
available. Similar to a producing reservoir, there must be a porous and permeable 
formation capable of receiving injected fluids nearby.” Id. 
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1. State Regulations in Place 
State oil and gas regulatory agencies provide guidance for pro-
tection of the environment and workers onsite with regulations ad-
dressing a broad range of production activities, including permit re-
quirements, the required depth of protective casing, and even the 
time needed for the cement to dry before drilling continues.
88
  The 
state regulatory approach has been described as a “cradle-to-grave” 
method that covers everything from “the drilling and fracture of the 
well, production operations, management and disposal of wastes, [to] 
abandonment and plugging of the well.”
89
 
The regulations require permits before drilling can commence 
and the application for such permits must include information re-
garding the well’s location, construction, operation, and reclama-
tion.
90
  Some states compel operators to post a financial security or 
show financial resources sufficient to accomplish compliance with all 
applicable regulations.
91
  States have also instituted voluntary reviews 
of their relevant statutes to ensure that regulatory programs are up to 
date and successful.
92
  All of the states overlying the Marcellus Shale 
formation are members of the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact 
Commission (IOGCC).
93
  Other third parties also produce reviews for 
 
 88 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 52–53; see, e.g., IND. CODE § 14-37-7-5 
(2011) (production string of casing requirement); 2010 KY. ACTS § 353.100 (casings 
requirement); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 319.51 (2010) (supervisor of wells to provide reg-
ulations relating to casing among other well activities); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 
23-0305. (Gould 2012) (drilling, casing, and completion programs’ purpose in pre-
venting pollution); 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 601.503 (West 2010) (department’s authority 
to “issue such orders” necessary to enforce provisions of oil and gas act); 16 TEX. 
ADMIN. CODE § 3.8 (2012) (Texas Railroad Commission’s prohibition against pollu-
tion of either surface or subsurface water). 
 89 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 26. 
 90 Id.; see, e.g., N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-16 (2009) (“No drilling activity shall 
commence until such application is approved and a permit to drill is issued by the 
director.”). 
 91 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 26; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 377.2425 
(2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-238 (2010); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 715/5 (2010); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 324.61506 (p) (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-1-104 (2010); N.Y. 
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0305 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.07 (LexisNexis 
2011); 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 601.503 (West 2010); W. VA. CODE  R. § 22-21-6 (2010).  
But see Keith G. Baurle, Reaping the Whirlwind: Federal Oil & Gas Development on Private 
Lands in the Rocky Mountain West, 83 DENV. U.L. REV. 1083, 1085 n.12 (2006) (criticiz-
ing the adequacy of such bonds to protect landowners potentially harmed). 
 92 See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 93 See Member States, INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMMISSION, 
http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/member-states (last visited Mar. 21, 2012); Map of Mar-
cellus Shale, INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMMISSION, 
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the public’s education.
94
  For instance, the Ground Water Protection 
Council (GWPC) produces reviews of state Underground Injection 
Control (UIC) programs.
95
  GWPC also compiles a list of state agen-
cies that promulgate regulations impacting groundwater and pro-
vides links to the agencies’ websites.
96
  An independent organization 
drawn from state, industry, and environmental stakeholders, known 
as STRONGER (State Review of Oil and Natural Gas Environmental 
Regulation, Inc.),
97
 also offers a set of guidelines against which to 
judge state oil and gas environmental programs other than UIC pro-
grams.
98
 
New York State has been particularly proactive in identifying po-
tential threats to water resources.  The New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation, Division of Mineral Resources, pro-
duced a comprehensive draft supplemental generic environmental 
impact statement (Draft SGEIS) in 2009.
99
  As part of this effort, New 
York asked multiple consulting groups
100
 to evaluate the following fac-
tors identified as potentially leading to groundwater contamination 
from high-volume hydraulic fracturing: 
 
http://www.marcellusshales.com/marcellusshalemap.html (last visited Mar. 21, 
2012) (depicting of the contours of the Marcellus Shale superimposed on the states 
overlying the formation).  The IOGCC is a government agency that spans multiple 
states and “works to ensure our nation’s oil and natural gas resources are conserved 
and maximized while protecting health, safety and the environment.”  About Us, 
INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMMISSION, http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/about-us 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2012). 
 94 See, e.g., Independent Review Completed of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection Program Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing of Oil & Gas Wells, BUSINESS WIRE 
(Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/ 
20100923006018/en/Independent-Review-Completed-Pennsylvania-Department-
Environmental-Protection [hereinafter Independent Review Completed of Pennsylvania 
Program].  
 95 Underground Injection Control, GROUND WATER PROTECTION COUNCIL, 
http://www.gwpc.org/uic/uic.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).  
 96 State Information, GROUND WATER PROTECTION COUNCIL, 
http://www.gwpc.org/state_resources/state_resources.htm click on “State Agencies 
List” for the Excel spreadsheet) (last visited Mar. 21, 2012). 
 97 List of State Reviews, STRONGER, INC., 
http://www.strongerinc.org/reviews/reviews.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2012). 
 98 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 26. 
 99 See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14. 
 100 The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority contracted 
with consulting groups for the research needed to produce the SGEIS to ICF Inter-
national, along with Alpha Environmental, Inc., URS Corporation and NTC Consult-
ants.  N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 6-37 to -38. 
CRICCO-LIZZA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2012  3:49 PM 
2012] COMMENT 717 
 
• wellbore101 failure,102 
• subsurface pathways,103 
• waste transport,104 
• centralized flowback water surface impoundments,105 
• fluid discharges,106 
• treatment facilities,107 
• disposal wells,108 
• solids disposal,109 
• naturally occurring radioactive material disposition 
(NORM),
110
 
• cuttings volume,111 
• cuttings and liner associated with mud drilling,112 
• potential impacts to subsurface New York City water sup-
ply infrastructure,
113
 
 
 101 A wellbore is also known as a borehole or the hole drilled by the bit.  N.Y. 
STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, GLOSSARY FOR DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 20 (2009), available at 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/odsgeisglossary.pdf.  “A well-
bore may have casing in it or it may be open (uncased); or part of it may be cased, 
and part of it may be open.  Also called a borehole or hole.”  Id.  
 102 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 6-37.  “[T]he 
probability of fracture fluids reaching an underground source of drinking water 
(USDW) from properly constructed wells due to subsequent failures in the casing or 
casing cement due to corrosion is estimated at less than 2 x 10-8 (fewer than 1 in 50 
million wells).”  Id. 
 103 Id. at 6-37 to -38. 
 104 Id. at 6-38. 
 105 Id. at 6-38 to -39.  “Operators may propose to store flowback water prior to or 
after dilution in the onsite lined pits or tanks . . ., or in centralized facilities consist-
ing of tanks or one or more engineered impoundments.”  Id. at 5-113. 
 106 Id. at 6-39. 
 107 Id. at 6-39 to -40. 
 108 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 6-40. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id.  “Marcellus shale is known to contain NORM concentrations at higher lev-
els than surrounding rock formations,” requiring employers to perform testing and 
provide appropriate worker protection.  Id. at 6-129–6-130.  As this impacts water 
supplies, however, New York has found that “[b]ased on the analytical results from 
field-screening and gamma ray spectroscopy performed on samples of Marcellus 
shale, NORM levels in cuttings are not likely to pose a problem.”  Id. at 6-40. 
 111 Id.  Cuttings volume consists of “[t]he very fine-grained rock fragments re-
moved by the drilling process [which] are returned to the surface in the drilling fluid 
and managed either within a closed-loop tank system or a lined on-site reserve pit.”  
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14 at 5-29. 
 112 Id. at 6-41. 
CRICCO-LIZZA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2012  3:49 PM 
718 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:703 
 
• degradation of New York City’s drinking water supply,114 
• floodplains,115 
• primary and principle aquifers,116 
• freshwater wetlands, ecosystems and wildlife,117 and 
• air quality.118 
The consulting groups determined that the regulations implemented 
in New York are “sufficient to prevent fracturing fluid from flowing 
upward along the wellbore and contacting water-bearing strata adja-
cent to the borehole.”
119
  As part of the analysis that led to this con-
clusion, the groups analyzed the possibility of fracturing fluids mi-
grating beneath the surface of the ground into USDWs.
120
  Typical 
conditions for hydraulic fracturing produce wells with similar charac-
teristics: aquifer maximum depth is less than 1000 feet, the fracture 
zone is greater than 2000 feet, the average hydraulic conductivity of 
intervening strata remains less than 1E-5 cm/sec, and the average po-
rosity of intervening strata is over ten percent.
121
  The report that, 
even in circumstances that are most favorable to flow, the current 
practices of hydraulic fracturing generate pressures and volumes that 
are insufficient “to cause migration of fluids from the fracture zone to 
the overlying aquifer in the short time that fracturing pressures 
would be applied.”
122
 
The Draft SGEIS identified at least one regulatory jurisdiction 
associated with each of the twenty-seven distinct events in the lifecycle 
of a horizontal well.
123
  The regulatory jurisdictions include local gov-
ernment and health agencies, New York City agencies, New York 
State agencies, and federal agencies.
124
 
 
 113 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 6-41. 
 114 Id. at 6-41 to -42. 
 115 Id. at 6-42. 
 116 Id. at 6-42 to -43. 
 117 Id. at 6-43 to -48. 
 118 Id. at 6-48 to -94. 
 119 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 5-148. 
 120 Id. at 6-53 to -56. 
 121 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 5-148. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 8-10 tbl.8.1. 
 124 Id.  Local government agencies included the New York City Department of En-
vironmental Protection; New York State provided oversight through the Department 
of Environmental Conservation Divisions & Offices (Division of Mineral Resources, 
Division of Environmental Permits, Division of Water, Division of Solid and Hazard-
ous Materials, Division of Fish, Wildlife and Marine Resources, Division of Air Re-
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In Pennsylvania, oil and gas well developers must adhere to the 
Oil and Gas Act when they drill in the state.
125
  Primarily, the Act re-
quires drillers to procure a permit prior to beginning any drilling.
126
  
Permit fees are keyed to the length of the wellbore and the permit 
application requires a water management plan.
127
  Other regulations 
address duties that arise before receiving the permit, including sur-
veys, stipulation of angles and directions of non-vertical wells, and 
provision of notice to surface owners.
128
  Pennsylvania’s Department 
of Environmental Protection plays an active, protective, and produc-
tive role in the regulation of oil and gas development and produc-
tion,
129
 including oversight of permit and inspection programs.
130
 
2. Issues Facing State Regulators 
Once an agency is tasked with the specific role of regulating a 
part of the process, lack of scientific evidence demonstrating specific 
risks leaves the agency hobbled.  “Regulatory officials from 15 states 
have recently testified that groundwater contamination from the hy-
draulic fracturing procedure is not known to have occurred despite 
the procedure’s widespread use in many wells over several decades.”
131
  
Issues arising in the producing states have largely related to insuffi-
cient casing or negligent operation of wells, in violation of existing 
 
sources), the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, the Public 
Service Commission, and the Office of Parks, Recreation & Historic Preservation; 
and federal agency involved were identified as the EPA, the United States Depart-
ment of Transportation, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  Id.  
 125 58 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 601.101–.605 (West 1996); see Laura C. Reeder, Creating a 
Legal Framework for Regulation of Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale For-
mation, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 999, 1016 (2009).  Part IV of  the note 
provides a comprehensive overview of the Pennsylvania regulation of drilling at both 
state and local levels.  Id. at 1015–20. 
 126 Reeder, supra note 125, at 1014. 
 127 PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., MARCELLUS SHALE WELL PERMIT APPLICATION FEES 
FACT SHEET (Apr. 2009), available at 
http://www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-84138/5500-FSDEP4239. 
pdf; Reeder, supra note 125, at 1015, nn.141–42 (citing Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 601.101–.201 (West 1996)). 
 128 § 601.201. 
 129 See Office of Oil and Gas Management, PA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/oilgas.htm (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2012). 
 130 See Independent Review Completed of Pennsylvania Program, supra note 94. 
 131 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 6-37. 
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regulations.
132
  In June 2010, the blowout of a well drilled into the 
Marcellus Shale in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania, brought re-
sponders from the state, as well as industry experts from Texas and 
the federal government.
133
  Another blowout in the town of Killdeer 
resulted in a spill of more than 2000 barrels of oil and frack fluid.
134
  
The Killdeer spill was the first well blowout since the Department of 
Mineral Resources began requiring both pressure testing and the use 
of pressure-release valves during high-pressure hydraulic fracturing 
procedures in 2008.
135
  The Department of Mineral Resources, as the 
state’s regulatory agency, has demonstrated a responsive and conser-
vationist attitude since the blowout.
136
  The Mineral Resources Direc-
tor traced the impetus behind the department’s decision to impose 
regulation in 2008 to the previous blowouts seen in the state.
137
  Envi-
ronmental organizations, however, have complained that the current 
regulation lags behind industry innovation and that looming budget 
cuts will cripple already lax enforcement.
138
 
C. Federal Oversight of Hydraulic Fracturing 
1. Federal Statutes Regulate Parts of the Hydraulic 
Fracturing Process 
General commercial use of complex chemicals, not only in hy-
draulic fracturing, is subject to scrutiny under numerous federal envi-
 
 132 PA. ST. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OVERVIEW, availa-
ble at http://files.dep.state.pa.us/OilGas/BOGM/BOGM 
PortalFiles/MarcellusShale/DEP%20Fracing%20overview.pdf.  
 133 Gas Well Blowout Under Control in Clearfield County, WJACTV.COM (June 4, 2010, 
10:44 AM), http://www.wjactv.com/print/23792353/detail.html [hereinafter Gas 
Well Blowout Under Control]. 
 134 Lauren Donovan, Killdeer Oil Spill Being Cleaned Up, Officials Investigate, 
BISMARCK TRIBUNE (Sept. 2, 2010, 12:34 AM), 
http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/article_af6a8bd2-b712-
11df-b4ff-001cc4c03286.html. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Mark Guarino, Gulf Oil Spill Report Warning: U.S. Must Watch Offshore Drilling 
More Closely, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0111/Gulf-oil-spill-report-warning-US-must-
watch-offshore-drilling-more-closely.  “‘The technology, laws and regulations, and 
practices for containing, responding to, and cleaning up the spills lag behind the re-
al risk associated with [oil and gas production] . . . government must close the exist-
ing gap and industry must support rather than resist that effort,’ the report states.” 
Id. 
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ronmental statutes.
139
  All laws, regulations, and permit procedures 
that bind conventional oil and gas exploration and production also 
attach to activities aimed at producing natural gas from unconven-
tional sources.
140
  This Comment, however, examines only the poten-
tial results of the Act to amend the SDWA pending in Congress.  Un-
der the current version of the SDWA, Congress provided the EPA 
with a lever to use against states’ inaction in protecting drinking wa-
ter sources—a means to halt any “race to the bottom.”
141
  The typical 
justifications for placing environmental regulation under federal con-
trol “reflect commonly understood collective action problems, in-
cluding negative environmental externalities, resource pooling, the 
‘race to the bottom,’ uniform standards, and the ‘NIMBY’ (not in my 
 
 139 For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers oversees any wetlands neces-
sary permits.  Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006); see also Steven G. Da-
vison, General Permits Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 35 
(2009) (discussing in detail the permit requirements under this federal statute).  The 
U.S. Department of Transportation oversees transportation of fracturing fluids as 
hazardous chemicals.  49 U.S.C. § 5103 (2006).  The EPA retains primary jurisdiction 
over injection-well disposal under the SDWA.  42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j(26) (2006).  
Additionally, “the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) gives the EPA 
the authority to control hazardous waste from the ‘cradle-to-grave.’  This includes the 
generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste.” 
Summary of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, EPA (June 28, 2006), 
http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/rcra.html; see also Gas Well Blowout Under Control, 
supra note 133.  In a recent blowout of a well drilled into the Marcellus Shale in 
Clearfield County, Pennsylvania, responders came from the state level, as well as in-
dustry experts drawn from Texas and the federal government.  Id.  
 140 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 25. 
 141 For a detailed discussion of the “race-to-the-bottom” rationale for environmen-
tal regulation, see Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspec-
tive on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate 
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 597–98 (2008). 
Another rationale for federal environmental regulation is the so-called 
“race to the bottom.”  A race to the bottom assumes that competition 
for business and industry will create a prisoner’s dilemma in which 
states are driven to relax their environmental standards in order to 
gain the economic benefits and tax revenues that the business or in-
dustry brings.  Individual states have the incentives to lower standards 
to compete for industry whether or not other states do the same, even 
though the states as a collective would be better off not doing so.  Some 
environmental law scholars have argued either that the race to the bot-
tom is not an empirical reality or that interjurisdictional competition is 
a good thing because it tends to produce socially efficient outcomes.  
Other academics have responded that the race to the bottom has been 
and remains a factor that provides obstacles to effective state environ-
mental regulation. 
Id.  
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back yard) phenomenon.”
142
  These concerns about pollution are par-
ticularly relevant in the context of protecting drinking water,
143
 which 
consists of both surface and groundwater.
144
  The resource of water is 
vulnerable to conflicts arising out of non-uniform protection due to 
its migratory characteristics.
145
  Pollution spreads through migratory 
resources when states provide insufficiently protective regulation.
146
  
The difficulty in providing uniform protection is, in part, due to the 
fact that, between more protective and less protective states, 
courts are apt to discount or disregard empirical evidence relating 
to a statute’s population health impact while accepting almost at 
face value claims relating to the burdens a statute imposes on 
commerce. Thus not only do the federal courts now frequently 
ignore public health claims in particular cases, they also some-
times reject, ostensibly as beyond their competence, the empirical 
and epidemiological evidence that public health can provide in 
support or refutation of particular public health statutes.
147
 
As part of the SDWA program, the EPA requires states to devel-
op regulations that at least meet the minimum standards established 
by the Agency before the states can obtain federal authorization to 
run their own UIC program.
148
  But, because the SDWA does not ex-
plicitly define the term “underground injection” to include the pro-
cess of hydraulic fracturing, the interpretation of that phrase belongs 
in the hands of the agency implementing the statute: the EPA.
149
  Un-
 
 142 Id. at 593–94. 
 143 The Water Cycle: Ground Water Discharge, USGS (Dec. 27, 2011), 
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/watercyclegwdischarge.html.  
 144 P. JAYA RAMA REDDY, A TEXTBOOK OF HYDROLOGY 289 (2005) (“A groundwater 
basin is filled and the excess water is discharged by several ways until a quasi-
equilibrium is reached.”). 
 145 Marc K. Landy, Local Government and Environmental Policy, in DILEMMAS OF SCALE 
IN AMERICA’S FEDERAL DEMOCRACY 227, 228 (Martha Derthick, ed. 1999) (“Air and 
water move; they do not respect state lines.”).  In particular, Landy observed that in-
creased agricultural and industrial output occurring post-World War II resulted in 
such significant pollution that economic damage following the detrimental effect on 
the environment would indeed spill over state boundaries.  Id. at 228–29. 
 146 WENDY E. PARMENT, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE LAW 78, 100–01 
(2009). 
 147 Id. at 97–98. 
 148 42 U.S.C. § 300h(a)(1), (b)(1) (2006). 
 149 Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 276 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 
2001) (requiring the EPA to determine whether Alabama’s revised UIC program 
provided an adequate permitting process for hydraulic fracturing).  Using the two-
part Chevron test, the court determined that the intent of Congress was not clear as to 
whether hydraulic fracturing fell within the purview of “underground injection,” and 
thus the Agency was entitled to controlling weight for its interpretation of the 
CRICCO-LIZZA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2012  3:49 PM 
2012] COMMENT 723 
 
der SDWA § 300g-1, the EPA must establish a maximum acceptable 
level for specified contaminants and create a “national drinking water 
regulation,” but only if certain conditions obtain.
150
  The Administra-
tor must first determine that the following three permissive charac-
teristics are present: (1) the contaminant may have an adverse effect 
on human health, (2) the likelihood of permeating public water sys-
tems at a rate and quantity that gives rise to health concerns has be-
come a “substantial likelihood,” and (3) “in the sole judgment of the 
Administrator, regulation of” the contaminant will present the op-
portunity to reduce risk to human health.
151
 
Additionally, to ensure that the contaminant is properly catego-
rized, the Administrator must base this determination on “best avail-
able, peer-reviewed science.”
152
  The Administrator must examine sev-
en factors,
153
 two of which particularly require that “quantifiable and 
non-quantifiable health risk reduction benefits” exist “for which there 
is a factual basis to conclude” that such benefits would likely follow to 
identified populations.
154
  In light of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, “considerable weight should be accorded to an 
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is en-
trusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administra-
tive interpretations.”
155
  This dynamic is particularly illustrated in the 
 
phrase, despite the existence of other possible interpretations, unless such interpre-
tation was inconsistent with the clear terms of the statute.  Id. at 1264. 
 150 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (2006). 
 151 Id. 
 152 § 300g-1 (b)(3)(A)(i). 
 153 § 300g-1 (b)(3)(C)(i)(I)–(VII).  The statue lists the seven factors to be consid-
ered: (1) that reductions in health risks will occur as a result of compliance with the 
proposed treatment, (2) that the proposed treatment will target the contaminants 
causing the damage, (3) that costs resulting from the regulation are justified, (4) that 
the “incremental costs” resulting from compliance with the regulation have been 
considered, (5) that the contaminant’s effect(s) on the general public as well as on 
children, the elderly, and pregnancies have been considered, (6) that the Adminis-
trator has considered any increased health risks stemming from compliance; and (7) 
any other “relevant factors,” with discretion vested solely in the administrative agen-
cy.  Id. 
 154 § 300g-1 (b)(3)(C)(i)(I), (II).   
 155 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (internal citation omitted).  Judicial deference is con-
sistent with a co-equal branch of government’s review of matters explicitly delegated 
to administrative agencies when Congress relinquishes its discretionary power.  INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–59 (1983) (holding that Congress may not delegate au-
thority to an executive branch agency while maintaining in the statute a clause grant-
ing to itself a legislative veto over actions of the executive branch because that is in-
consistent with the bicameralism principle and Presentment Clause of the United 
States Constitution). 
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SDWA, in which Congress directed the EPA to apply its scientific and 
environmental expertise to evaluate best practices and promulgate 
appropriate regulatory schemes beyond the scope of the legislature’s 
expertise or time to manage.
156
 
2. Science, Policy, and Regulation 
i. The EPA’s Application of the Precautionary Principle 
The precautionary principle requires that “when an activity rais-
es threats of harm to human health or the environment, precaution-
ary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relation-
ships are not fully established scientifically.”
157
  This precept is one 
that remains deeply entrenched in the environmental management 
field,
158
 and particularly in the American conception of environmen-
tal regulation.
159
  Prevention rather than a cure is generally preferred; 
it is easier not to drop a fragile vase than it would be to clean up the 
myriad shards it would become once it hits the ground.  On the other 
hand, where two mutually exclusive options present both advantages 
and dangers, it is extraordinarily difficult to pick one as the objective-
ly better choice.  Similarly, contemporary environmental risks engen-
der complexities of scale, context, and uncertainty that make applica-
tion of the precautionary principle difficult.
160
  The application of the 
precautionary principle could have a sizeable impact on the scope 
 
 156 See The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996: Strengthening Protection for 
America’s Drinking Water, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/sdwa/theme.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 
2012) [hereinafter The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996]. 
 157 Joel A. Tickner, Introduction, in PRECAUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, AND 
PREVENTATIVE PUBLIC POLICY, at xiii, xiii–xiv (Joel A. Tickner, ed. 2003) (quoting the 
1998 Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The four central components of the principle, as identified in the 
statement, are: “(1) taking preventive action in the face of uncertainty, (2) shifting 
burdens onto proponents of potentially harmful actions, (3) exploring a wide range 
of alternatives to possibly harmful actions, and (4) increasing public participation in 
decision-making.”  Id. at xiv (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 158 MICHAEL FAURE & GORAN SKOGH, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY & LAW 19, 21–26 (2003).  
 159 See, e.g., Pollution Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13101 (2006); see also CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 99 (2002).  Consider 
“the phaseout of lead in gasolines, the use of solar power, and the substitution of 
electric cars for cars powered by gasoline.”  Id. at 100. 
 160 Joel A. Tickner, The Role of Environmental Science in Precautionary Decision Making, 
in PRECAUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, AND PREVENTATIVE PUBLIC POLICY supra note 
157, at 3, 4. 
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and recommendations of the study that the EPA is currently produc-
ing. 
ii. Politics and Public Involvement in EPA Scientific 
Practices 
The EPA is seeking to involve all interested stakeholders in the 
articulation of the scope and methodology of its study on hydraulic 
fracturing’s effects on groundwater.
161
  This is consistent with the 
EPA’s current practices in both community involvement and ac-
countability.
162
  “[I]n the context of complex environmental and 
health risks, it is much more useful to think of science and policy as 
dynamically informing each other . . . .”
163
  Science is the basis on 
which to ground policy determinations, and public policy should pri-
oritize which environmental issues to research first.
164
  The study’s 
conclusions regarding the practice’s effects on groundwater will un-
doubtedly influence whether the EPA will regulate the use of hydrau-
lic fracturing.  The study would lose integrity, however, if it were 
structured around that knowledge so as to affect a particular out-
come. 
Ideally, if policy-setting behind environmental regulation was 
merely an empirical choice, it would be easy—through the weight of 
scientific evidence and the significance of intelligent recommenda-
tions—to articulate a new program and implement logical changes to 
the existing procedures.
165
  “However, the policy process is more 
complex than superficial change can accommodate.  In addition to 
context programs and administrative activity, the formulation and 
implementation process relies on something deeper and more fun-
damental: a core moral or normative belief.”
166
  Policy sets prefer-
ences in funding, priority, and objectives: the message communicated 
 
 161 EPA Seeks Gas-Drilling Facts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2010, at B2.  The EPA re-
quested and received disclosure of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing by the nine 
biggest natural gas companies and contractors.  Id.  The EPA also scheduled several 
public meetings for stakeholders. Id. 
 162 See The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, supra note 156. 
 163 Tickner, supra note 157, at xiii. 
 164 Id. 
 165 John Martin Gillroy & Joe Bowersox, Introduction: The Roots of Moral Austerity in 
Environmental Policy Discourse, in THE MORAL AUSTERITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION 
MAKING: SUSTAINABILITY, DEMOCRACY, AND NORMATIVE ARGUMENT IN POLICY AND LAW 1, 
5 (John Martin Gillroy & Joe Bowersox eds., 2002). 
 166 Id.  
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by the preferences is a moral statement.
167
  That belief must be con-
sistent across the law’s reformulations, despite regular revisions and 
opportunity for competing moral standards to devise alternate meth-
ods of operation.
168
 
Hydraulic fracturing produces virulent and intractable responses 
in its advocates and opponents alike.  Such responses in the public 
make it difficult to establish a uniform policy.  For instance, at a pub-
lic stakeholders’ meeting that the EPA held in Pennsylvania, Regional 
Administrator Judith Enck requested input regarding the design of 
the study proposed to be concluded in 2012, “not about the merits of 
hydraulic fracturing.”
169
  And nonetheless, “[n]early all [of the impas-
sioned speakers present] urged the EPA to base its study on science, 
rather than emotion or political pressure—as long as it was the sci-
ence that supported their position.”
170
 
The public has a limited scientific and historical context from 
which it can promote rational views on the preferred balance of eco-
nomic and public health interests.
171
  “[I]n recent years, environmen-
tal groups and community activists, pointing to inconclusive but 
sometimes compelling anecdotes of possible water contamination, 
have complained that the drilling practice is far too loosely regulated.  
Those complaints increased after the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexi-
co.”
172
  Notably, the causes of the BP oil spill are but tenuously con-
nected to possible future EPA regulation of hydraulic fracturing.
173
  
This combination of inflammatory discourse and lack of specialized 
 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. (paraphrasing GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, EVIDENCE, ARGUMENT AND 
PERSUASION IN THE POLICY PROCESS 146–49 (1989)). 
 169 Maykuth,  supra note 40.  
 170 Id. 
 171 Zeller, supra note 46. 
 172 Id.; see infra notes 208–18 and accompanying text. 
 173 See generally Christian Garcia, Halliburton Comments on National Commission Ce-
ment Testing, BUSINESS WIRE (Oct. 29, 2010), 
http://ir.halliburton.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=67605&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1489 
037&highlight= (“Well logs and rig personnel confirm that the well was not flowing 
after the cement job.  BP and/or others, following the misinterpreted negative re-
sults conducted after the cement job proceeded to displace mud in the production 
casing and riser with lighter sea water, allowing the well to flow.  Given these numer-
ous intervening causes, Halliburton does not believe that the foam cement design 
used on the Macondo well was the cause of the incident.”); Ian Urbina, BP Spill Report 
Hints at Legal Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/09/us/09spill.html. 
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public knowledge leads to over-promotion of regulation without 
meaningful, critical analysis of the likely outcomes of such regulation. 
iii. Previous EPA Study on Hydraulic Fracturing’s Impacts 
on Drinking Water 
The EPA previously produced a study on hydraulic fracturing 
that has come under attack for being too influenced by the private 
sector’s interests.
174
  In 2004, the EPA produced a report evaluating 
the impacts of hydraulic fracturing on USDWs.
175
  During the first 
phase of the study, the EPA identified three specific means through 
which contaminants could migrate from the location where hydraulic 
fracturing was being used to USDWs: either direct injection into the 
USDW, creation of a hydrological connection between the coalbed 
and a USDW, or injection into a fracture already in “hydraulic com-
munication with a USDW.”
176
  The EPA also studied reports of drink-
ing water well contamination, finding no confirmatory evidence link-
ing the hydraulic fracturing process to the contamination.
177
  The first 
phase of the study ended the enquiry: the EPA looked at existing lit-
erature, interviewed industry and government officials, and solicited 
comments from concerned citizen and environmental groups.
178
 
Based on these preliminary assessments, the EPA concluded that 
there was “no conclusive evidence that water quality degradation in 
USDWs is a direct result of injection of hydraulic fracturing fluids in-
 
 174 See Wiseman, supra note 57, at 170–80.  Part V of Professor Wiseman’s article 
details the accusation levied against the EPA’s lack of objectivity in producing the 
study, in particular the decision to stop the study before instituting a more compre-
hensive examination of hydraulic fracturing.  Id. at 172.  The EPA is not only subject 
to the overbearing interests of the private sector; it also faces considerable pressure 
from the political party in power during the course of any particular decision.  Id. at 
178. 
 175 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF 
DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS STUDY 
(2004), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_coal
bedmethanestudy.cfm.  
 176 Id. at ES-1. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at ES-8.  The EPA looked at water quality incident reports that may have 
been associated with CBM hydraulic fracturing.  The Agency examined over 200 
peer-reviewed publications, spoke with approximately fifty employees of industry 
leaders and officials at state and local government agencies, and contacted more 
than 500 local or county agencies in potentially affected areas, receiving no com-
plaints from these officials.  Id. at 7-1.  The Agency also contacted and took com-
ments from  approximately forty concerned citizens and environmental groups.  Id. 
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to CBM wells and subsequent underground movement of these flu-
ids.”
179
  Additionally, the EPA concluded that chemicals, even if in-
jected directly through USDWs, are unlikely to have more than min-
imal effect: “groundwater production, combined with the mitigating 
effects of dilution and dispersion, adsorption, and potentially biodeg-
radation, minimize the possibility that chemicals included in the frac-
turing fluids would adversely affect USDWs.”
180
  Finally, citing the ex-
pansive horizontal and vertical distances between most USDWs and 
methane coal beds, the EPA determined that the material barrier be-
tween the two would prevent breach and contamination.
181
 
In light of the results of the first phase, the EPA declined to pro-
duce a time-consuming, expensive study of hydraulic fracturing be-
yond the scope of the initial question, which it had already an-
swered.
182
  Based on the study’s conclusions, Congress passed the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005
183
 to amend the SDWA,
184
 removing hydrau-
lic fracturing from its jurisdiction and ending any perceived ambigui-
ty in the statute.
185
  The FRAC Act, currently pending in Congress, 
seeks to change this exception and would require the EPA to regulate 
hydraulic fracturing.
186
  To properly balance the interests of the oil 
and gas industry against those of local businesses, citizens, and state 
and local governments, the federal government should approach this 
new avenue for regulation with eagerness to cooperate with existing 
state statutory schema and a respect for the competing and comple-
mentary interests of all parties. 
IV. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 
A. Overview of Cooperative Federalism 
Cooperative federalism models share power between federal and 
state or local governments to promote consistency across the nation 
as well as localized solutions.
187
  Within this collaborative dynamic, the 
 
 179 Id. at 7-2. 
 180 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 175, at 7-3. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 7-5. 
 183 Pub. L. 109-58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1) 
(2006)). 
 184 42 U.S.C. § 300h (d) (2006). 
 185 Committee Report: Legislative Committee, 27 ENERGY L. J. 349, 353 (2006). 
 186 See Lustgarten, supra note 48. 
 187 Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L. J. 179, 184 (2005). “[C]ooperative federalism . . . requires a greater degree 
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federal government remains the paramount authority.
188
  For envi-
ronmental policy, a marked preference for cooperative federalism 
permeates the statutes enacted over the past thirty years.
189
 
The allocation of decision-making authority between federal or 
local government, industry, and citizens confronts fundamental ques-
tions related to democracy and citizen-government in the United 
States.
190
  Individual involvement and interest in decision-making 
drops precipitously when the benefits connected to a decision are dif-
fused across a large population.
191
  This response occurs because the 
perceived cost of influencing a self-beneficial outcome outweighs the 
perceived benefit of promoting that outcome.
192
  “Centralized re-
gimes relying upon mandatory prescriptions that constrain discretion 
on the part of individuals are often accompanied by processes of psy-
chological detachment, social disengagement, and loss of initiative on 
the part of those who seek to minimize their individual costs of en-
 
of coordination between the two levels of government.  Since the New Deal, coopera-
tive federalism typically appears as congressional or administrative efforts to induce 
(but not coerce or commandeer) states to participate in a coordinated federal pro-
gram.”  Id. 
 188 Id. at 183.  “The adjectival root, ‘federal,’ aptly implies the strong national gov-
ernment created in the U.S. Constitution to repair the relatively weak central gov-
ernment created by the Articles of Confederation.  Therefore, most scholarly ap-
proaches to federalism emphasize the national government as the dominant 
partner.”  Id. 
 189 See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse 
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 737–47 (2005).  
Part II.B.2.b of Professor Glicksman’s article provides a comprehensive description of 
federal environmental statutes employing the use of cooperative federalism ideals in 
structure and implementation.  Id. at 737–47. 
 190 See Bruce Ledewitz, The Present and Future of Federalism, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 645, 
645–47 (2005).  Part I describes the relationship between federalism and the Consti-
tution and the rest of the article examines the importance of political checks provid-
ed through federalism concepts.  Id. at 645–47. 
 191 Some federalism incarnations draw heavily from the economic model of com-
petition among the states and local government propounded in 1956 by Tiebout, 
who theorized that the mobility of states’ citizenry, when combined with diverse gov-
ernmental models, would result in the efficient allocation of resources to the public.  
Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956).  
This method of governance reduces the problem of pluralism where fiscal and deci-
sional irresponsibility of representatives abounds because of the “concentration of 
benefits in a few hands while the concomitant costs are diffused among the popula-
tion as a whole.”  Landy,  supra note 145, at 231.  Where a population is large enough 
so that each individual is only required to contribute inconsequential amounts to 
achieve a single result, citizen involvement in decision-making drops precipitously.  
Id. at 232. 
 192 People with “skills and resources . . . better suited to the national scene have 
come to exert enormous leverage in Washington.”  Id. at 231. 
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trapment.”
193
  Consequently, in a centralized-control regime, the 
power to direct regulation would remain in the hands of a few—
either federal officials tasked with regulating the process or those pri-
vate individuals or corporations with sufficient economic incentive to 
participate.  Centralized control over environmental issues through 
federal regulation has been touted as the apex of regulation for non-
localized issues that is both sufficiently protective and efficient.
194
  
While national consistency in environmental protection has decided 
benefits, cooperative federalism allows decision-makers to weigh such 
benefits against the negative impacts that this kind of national uni-
formity will have at the local level. 
Legislation addressing potential environmental effects on 
groundwater from hydraulic fracturing will require significant in-
vestment of money for research, broad participation by stakeholders, 
and some compromise between two important national interests—
energy and protection of natural resources.
195
  In matters of this kind, 
where “some states may be unwilling to enact statutes, particularly 
costly legislation, only national legislation sufficiently addresses these 
issues.”
196
  While states can address and regulate hydraulic fracturing 
that occurs within the state’s boundaries,
197
 suspicion persists that 
such regulation does not adequately protect migratory resources.  
This is an area where federal regulation might be required because 
one state’s efforts to attract industry through looser regulation could 
have effects on another state’s water or air supply through down-
stream effects.
198
  Particularly for migratory resources that multiple 
states share or that are subject to effects from migratory pollution, 
“proponents of a purely federal approach reason that environmental 
concerns involve issues, such as air and water, not confined to any 
one state.”
199
 
 
 193 VINCENT OSTROM, THE MEANING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM: CONSTITUTING A SELF-
GOVERNING SOCIETY 124 (1991). 
 194 Krista Yee, “A Period of Consequences”: Global Warming Legislation, Cooperative Fed-
eralism, and the Fight Between the EPA and the State of California, 32 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y J. 183, 186 (2008).  “Since environmental problems have far reaching effects 
on national—in fact, global—concerns, some argue only national legislation can ad-
equately address these issue.”  Id. 
 195 See supra Part II.B. 
 196 Yee, supra note 194, at 186.  
 197 For a detailed discussion of state regulation, see supra Part III.B.1. 
 198 See Ledewitz, supra note 190, at 650 (“Scientifically speaking, there is no such 
thing, for example, as intrastate water.  All water has moved across state borders in 
the past and, of course, will do so again in the future.”). 
 199 Yee, supra note 194, at 186.  
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Despite these concerns, state and local authorities typically take 
on great responsibility for implementing broad policy goals, particu-
larly in the realm of environmental protection.  Environmental stat-
utes are largely administered through some form of cooperative fed-
eralism, requiring both federal and state participation.
200
  Allowing 
states the discretion to deviate from a federally-established norm en-
courages innovation, and such exploration of alternatives can expose 
policymaking errors.
201
  Additionally, cooperative federalism prevents 
some of the inefficiencies and policy failures that plague the com-
mand-and-control, centralized regulatory schema.  These include in-
efficiencies associated with having a wide range of programs that cov-
er interwoven aspects of a single problem, the difficulty in 
implementing “regulatory programs involv[ing] complex tradeoffs 
among competing social goals,” and the over-involvement of any sin-
gle interest group in setting policy throughout the regulatory pro-
cess.
202
 
B. Modified Cooperative Federalism 
1. Criticism of Cooperative Federalism 
The federal decision to devolve primary control over the federal 
programs—such as the UIC program—to the states has had its critics, 
despite the above-noted benefits.
203
  The critics point out that, in 
practice, devolution can sometimes result in “economic inefficiency 
 
 200 See Glicksman, supra note 189, at 737–47.  Part II.B.2.b of Professor 
Glicksman’s article provides a comprehensive description of federal statutes employ-
ing the use of cooperative federalism ideals in structure and implementation.  Id.  
 201 Henry Butler & Jonathan Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case 
for Reallocating Federal Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996).  
“[D]ecentralization allows other people to visit on legislators and regulators the con-
tent of their preferences and the rigors of the marketplace.”  Id. at 35 (citing Peter 
H. Aranson, Pollution Control: The Case for Competition, in INSTEAD OF REGULATION: 
ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 339, 383–84 (Robert W. Poole, Jr., 
ed., 1982)).  
 202 Cass Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 41 DUKE L. J. 607, 627 (1991). 
 203 See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 351, 374 (2000).  But see Shelia R. Foster, Meeting the Environmental Justice Chal-
lenge: Evolving Norms in Environmental Decisionmaking, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,992, 11,005 
(2000) (arguing that despite recent initiatives seeking to require environmental deci-
sion-makers to account for the limitations of current risk assessment methodology, 
there still exists a normative gap precludes full justice in environmental 
decisionmaking); Sheila R. Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collabora-
tion, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 459 (2002) (addressing the means necessary to decen-
tralize environmental decision-making without overpowering the voices of vulnerable 
communities). 
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of reinventing scientific and technical knowledge at the state level 
[that] more than counterbalances the supposed advantages of mov-
ing the standard-setting aspects of such decision-making closer to the 
people.”
204
  The criticism is accurate—needless repetition of complex 
science is an expensive method of encouraging participation by all 
interested citizens.  In addition, cooperative federalism has been dis-
paraged for fostering several problems: regulations that are less re-
sponsive to local preferences, higher taxes that are neither readily 
discernible nor traceable to a specific, received benefit, and lower ac-
countability of politicians in both local and national government.
205
 
One long-standing critic of cooperative federalism, Dr. Michael 
Greve, states that the theory produces insurmountable information 
costs, conceals accountability of elected representatives, and voids in-
dividual choice and state competition.
206
  His critique dismisses coop-
erative federalism as insufficiently decentralized government.  From 
the perspective of the individual citizen, these concerns represent 
substantial impediments to participation in policy-setting.  “Citizen-
ship is a mix of opportunity and obligation. . . . [A] voice in collective 
decisions [requires] . . . a share in the sacrifices those decisions im-
pose.  Centralizing policy and politics not only minimizes one’s voice 
in public affairs, it reduces one’s responsibilities.”
207
  When coopera-
tive federalism fails to protect true diversity of regulatory options, it 
devolves into a multi-tiered game of bureaucratic blame-shifting, 
where each level of government fails to provide the necessary checks 
and balances against the others.  As particularly illustrated in the sto-
ry of the Deepwater Horizon blowout,
208
 sharing responsibility be-
 
 204 Steinzor, supra note 203, at 374. 
 205 Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L. J. 557, 598 (2000) 
(“Any form of cooperative federalism will reduce the range of policy variation among 
the states and deprive citizens of the benefits of diversity and choice; produce taxa-
tion that is hidden and therefore in excess of the voters’ actual preferences; reduce 
political transparency; obscure political responsibility; and facilitate political blame-
shifting.”). 
 206 MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN 
57 (1999). 
 207 Landy, supra note 145, at 231. 
 208 For detailed information about the blowout, see Oil Spill Gulf of Mexico 2010, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/ (last visited Mar. 20, 
2012).  On April 20, 2010, the off-shore oil rig Deepwater Horizon had two days of 
work left to complete before its crew could place a temporary cap on the oil well that 
it had drilled and turn it over to a production platform, which would produce oil 
from the well thousands of feet below the surface of the ocean.  EMMET MAYER III & 
DAN SHEA, WHAT HAPPENED ON THE DEEPWATER HORIZON (2010), available at 
http://media.nola.com/news_impact/other/oil-cause-050710.pdf.  But as the rig 
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tween government authorities can result in a lack of transparency and 
agency capture. 
Both state regulators and federal agencies responsible for 
providing oversight of the oil and gas industry had neglected their re-
sponsibilities for policing the industry before the incident occurred 
and then continued to do so afterwards, instead of ensuring that the 
operators responded to the spill properly.
209
  Oil and seafood are 
mainstays of Louisiana’s economy.
210
  The explosion and subsequent 
spill of an estimated 4.4 million gallons of oil
211
 resulted in severe 
consequences, such as damage to the Louisiana wetlands,
212
 injury to 
the fishing industry,
213
 and a temporary moratorium on offshore drill-
ing in the Gulf.
214
  Various commentators have traced the causes of 
the explosion to industry-wide bad practices,
215
 specific operators’ 
poor decision-making,
216
 and the failure of government regulation.
217
  
 
disconnected, a blowout occurred and the rig exploded, catching fire and eventually 
sinking to the bottom of the ocean.  Id. 
 209 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL, FINAL REPORT 78 
(2011) (“Perhaps because of the cumulative lack of adequate resources, absence of a 
sustained agency mission, or sheer erosion of professional culture within some offic-
es, MMS [Mineral Management Services] came progressively to suffer from serious 
deficiencies of organization and management: the fundamental traits of any effective 
institution.”); id. at 138 (describing state officials’ confusion over whether the Staf-
ford Act or National Contingency Plan governed the spill response—one of which 
put state officials in charge with federal official assisting them, while the other put 
federal officials in charge); Steven Mufson, Federal Records Show Steady Stream of Oil 
Spills in Gulf Since 1964, WASH. POST, July 24, 2010, at A1.  Federal records clearly 
point to a consistently poor industry and regulator record with 517,847 barrels 
dumped in the Gulf.  Id.; see also Jen DeGregorio, Oil and Gas Development Permits 
Overwhelmingly Approved by Louisiana, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 30, 2010, at A1.  Many fed-
eral agencies, such as Mineral Management Services and the Department of Natural 
Resources, face dual obligations as both collectors of rents and regulators of the in-
dustries they manage.  DeGregorio, supra. 
 210 Chris Kirkham, Oil and Fish Worlds Are Entwined in the Same Net, TIMES-PICAYUNE, 
May 9, 2010, at A1. 
 211 David Hammer, History of Louisiana and Offshore Oil, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 18, 
2010, at A1. 
 212 David Batker et al., Gaining Ground: Wetlands, Hurricanes, and the Economy: The 
Value of Restoring the Mississippi River Delta, 40 E.L.R. 11106, 11107 (2010); Mark 
Schleifstein, Splitting the Bill is Tricky, BP’s Expenses Will Continue for Years, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, May 23, 2010, at A12. 
 213 Bruce Alpert, The Feds Declare Fisheries Disaster in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 25, 2010, at A4. 
 214 See Hammer, supra note 211. 
 215 Dana Milbank, Tusk-Tusk, Oil Execs, WASH. POST, June 16, 2010, at A2. 
 216 David Hammer, Five Key Human Errors, Colossal Mechanical Failure Led to Fatal 
Gulf Oil Rig Blowout, NOLO.COM (Sept. 5, 2010, 6:00 AM), 
CRICCO-LIZZA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2012  3:49 PM 
734 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:703 
 
In particular, the government agencies that bore the responsibility 
for regulating the industry were found to have either engaged in un-
ethical collusion with industry insiders or only laxly enforced the reg-
ulations that would have prevented the spill.
218
  Such regulatory fail-
ure reduces confidence in local, state, and national governments’ 
accountability, transparency, and objectivity. 
2. Answers from Fundamental Values of Federalism 
As a general political form, federalism is predicated in large part 
on competition between government actors to ensure the best provi-
sion of public services.
219
  The competition stems from the separation 
of powers and the functions of the government.
220
  The ultimate val-
ues of federalism derive from this tension intentionally created be-
tween national and local governments: 
All federal systems have reference to multiple units of govern-
ment, each of which has an autonomous existence. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Using power to check power amid opposite and rival interests 
(to combine phrases from Montesquieu and Madison) implies 
that such a system of government will have equilibrating tenden-
cies. . . . 
. . . . 
 
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-
spill/index.ssf/2010/09/5_key_human_errors_colossal_me.html. 
 217 Mufson, supra note 209.  Federal records demonstrate a consistently poor in-
dustry and regulator record through the failure that resulted in 517,847 barrels hav-
ing been dumped in the Gulf.  Id.; see also DeGregorio, supra note 209.  Many federal 
agencies, including the Mineral Management Services and the Department of Natu-
ral Resources, have nigh incompatible dual obligations as both collectors of rents 
and regulators of the industries they manage.  DeGregorio, supra note 209.   
 218 WILLIAM R. FREUDENBURG & ROBERT GRAMLING, BLOWOUT IN THE GULF: THE BP 
OIL SPILL DISASTER & THE FUTURE OF ENERGY IN AMERICA 51–61 (2011).  The history of 
the relationship between the oil industry and the federal regulators includes such 
sordid episodes as sex and drugs passing between the two as well as a long, consistent 
history of favoring production of economic benefits over regulation of environmen-
tal impacts.  Id.  The oil industry outpaced the agency in growth and “[t]he number 
of accidents, spills and deaths regularly occurring in the region has far surpassed the 
agency’s ability to investigate them.”  Marc Kaufman et al., MMS Investigations of Oil-
Rig Accidents Have History of Inconsistency, WASH. POST (July 18, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/17/AR2010071702807.html. 
 219 See generally GREVE, supra note 206 (arguing that the benefits of federalism de-
rive from the competition produced among different sovereigns). 
 220 Greve, supra note 205, at 576 (“[T]he founders sought to foster institutional 
conflicts as ‘auxiliary precautions’ against the dangers of an overbearing govern-
ment.”).  
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Government in a democratic society, then, is not simply a matter 
of command and control but of providing multiple structures that 
have reference to diverse methods of problem solving.
221
 
The checks and balances ensure that all levels of government com-
pete rather than collude—while intergovernmental collusion (where 
federalism dictates governmental competition) eviscerates this fun-
damental protection for citizens as the source of power.
222
  While 
people have natural “parochial loyalties” leading to greater interest 
and involvement in issues closest to home, the Constitution sought to 
empower the national government with sufficient powers and ability 
to provide incentives for citizens to overcome these natural inclina-
tions.
223
  Simultaneously, the citizens sought to limit the scope of the 
federal government’s power to interfere into the realm that the 
Founding Fathers envisioned as mere local concerns, so as to create a 
system that would foster state-specific solutions to local issues.
224
 
Federalism promotes diversity of local solutions to widespread is-
sues, prevention of tyranny, and citizen participation in democracy, 
as well as “the improvement of economic efficiency through competi-
tion among the states, the acceleration of progress through experi-
mentation by the states, and perhaps the protection of certain values 
of community.”
225
  Cooperative federalism, however, decreases com-
petition between governments. By its very nature, the theory works 
through collaboration between different governments, promoting 
both vertical and horizontal cooperation.
226
 
Coordination of broad-scale efforts with the minute details of 
particular situations requires multi-tiered cooperation to ensure that 
national standards are followed and to provide incentives for reluc-
tant jurisdictions to accept an unwanted standard.
227
  Unfortunately, 
 
 221 OSTROM, supra note 193, at 7, 16, 17. 
 222 See id.  at 16–17.  To compete, each seeks the preference and approval of the 
citizens under its jurisdiction. Id.  In addition, the state and local governments can 
engage in a horizontal form of competition for each other’s citizens.  See id.  
 223 See John Kincaid, The Competitive Challenge to Cooperative Federalism: A Theory of 
Federal Democracy, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY 
& EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 87, 87 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 
1991).   
 224 “Dual federalism stresses the need for a constitutional distribution of powers 
that maintains coordinate, semiautonomous governments able to perform exclusive 
and concurrent functions.”  Id. at 89. 
 225 Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering 
Rule?, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1321 (2000). 
 226 Greve, supra note 205, at 566. 
 227 Id. at 596. 
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the price of uniformity is that the system is rigid, insofar as the partic-
ipants fight off attempts to alter who it favors.  The opportunity to af-
fect national policy creates high stakes for big-interest involvement 
and the resultant policy schema correspondingly accommodates po-
litical and interest group influences, thus “giving organized groups a 
stake in the system.”
228
  This in turn reduces the number of successful 
challenges to a set protocol, not because the system rests on an ideal 
or unnaturally high-quality model, but merely because the political 
economy surrounding the system is antagonistic towards giving up 
any power in the burgeoning bureaucracy.
229
  The solution to this 
quandary is to reinsert fundamental federalism values of separate, 
concurrent governance by the different levels of government in order 
to inject competition into the system.  By returning competitive ele-
ments to cooperative federalism, the preference for a national stand-
ard that allows maximum transfer of funds and minimal accountabil-
ity will be held in check by placing more decision-making power 
closer to impacted populations. 
V. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM WILL ENSURE PROPER REGULATION  
IF BALANCED WITH DUE WEIGHT FOR STATE VARIATION 
Despite its problems, cooperative federalism is the best method 
for approaching regulation of hydraulic fracturing.  As an issue that 
draws heated and intractable responses from both adherents and crit-
ics, hydraulic fracturing is susceptible to overly rosy impact analysis by 
industry insiders and apocalyptic fear from environmental advocates.  
Informational asymmetries create difficulties for policy-setting bod-
ies—whether they are local governments writing ordinances, state 
legislators drafting well bond requirements, or the EPA putting to-
gether a national scientific study.  Each level of decision-making, 
however, has its own strengths and abilities to protect certain inter-
ests, and cooperative federalism will allow these individual contribu-
tions to be reflected in the final regulatory schema. 
State and local officials are necessarily more familiar with the 
terrain, processes, and current practices of the industry due to their 
history of regulating hydraulic fracturing as well as the state regula-
tors’ closer relationships with the geographical areas.
230
  Accordingly, 
state and local officials are better suited to effectively attend to regu-
 
 228 Id. at 560. 
 229 Id. at 596. 
 230 For a discussion of state regulation of hydraulic fracturing, see supra Part 
III.B.1. 
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latory activities governing hydraulic fracturing.  Moreover, permitting 
states to produce regulatory frameworks that further local goals will 
promote adaptive and particularized regulation, as opposed to a fed-
eral one-size-fits-all solution.
231
  However, state officials face looming 
budgetary restraints and growing informational asymmetries that 
make policy setting and enforcement a daunting task. 
To stay abreast of the dynamic expansion of the energy industry, 
both complex science and nuanced approaches to regulation are 
necessary.  Energy-producing companies are driven by profit and in-
novation, and they change technological marvels more quickly than 
regulators can produce scientific evidence of harm.  The regulatory 
schema should represent both accurate science and citizens’ prefer-
ences for environmental protection and industry development.  In 
formulating these regulations, the precautionary principle can pro-
vide guidance in the complex decision-making process if elected rep-
resentatives make broader, normative decisions:
232
 
While the precautionary principle can remind us of our moral du-
ty to prevent harm in general, it cannot prescribe what kind of 
sacrifice we should be prepared to make in each and every case.  
Thus the precautionary principle has the semantic status of a 
general norm rather than of a step-by-step rule of operation.
233
 
When regulatory decisions require policy setting, a focused use of the 
precautionary principle will produce regulations that protect industry 
as well as the environment.  Normative values underlie decisions that 
evaluate the extent to which the environment should be protected in 
a way that prejudices industry.  This is a function best suited for the 
legislative branch rather than being shoehorned into the restricted 
authority delegated to an administrative agency.
234
  The decisions 
about how to shape the landscape of the energy industry should be 
made with the help of consumers who have direct knowledge of the 
associated hardships or by their elected representatives, but not by 
appointed agency administrators who cannot be held directly ac-
countable for the wide-reaching consequences of their decisions. 
 
 231 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 25. 
 232 The precautionary principle encourages avoidance of potentially risky activities 
where all risks have yet to be identified.  This principle is difficult to follow when one 
population bears the risks that bring profit to a proponent of the activity.  See FAURE 
& SKOGH, supra note 158, at 19–26. 
 233 Id. at 22. 
 234 Matthias Kaiser, Ethics, Science, and Precaution: A View from Norway, in 
PRECAUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, AND PREVENTATIVE PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 
157, at 21, 22. 
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Modifying cooperative federalism to reflect the core, competitive 
values of federalism may cure some of the ills engendered by sharing 
responsibility.  By deliberately leaving room for states to enact varia-
tions of a federal program or protective scheme, rather than mandat-
ing the adoption or implementation of a uniform one, a more com-
petitive, modified form of cooperative federalism will produce 
regulations that reflect the moral decision-making of impacted popu-
lations.  Such potential variations do not need to be enunciated in a 
federal statute with explicit, limited possibilities.  Instead, letting the 
states independently develop multiple methods of reaching a federal-
ly mandated level of protection would be more beneficial.  This 
breathing room can permit some states to enact more stringent regu-
lations, encourage others to provide tax exemptions to conforming 
businesses, and force others to find funds for investment in infra-
structure that can ameliorate the greater burdens on individuals or 
businesses who must comply with the environmentally protective reg-
ulation.
235
  A solution that reflects these values of modified coopera-
tive federalism will provide a flexible, national, minimum standard 
that leaves room for state variation.
236
 
The federal government faces a recent, large-scale example of 
federal agencies’ failure to regulate the oil industry properly.
237
  Con-
gress must calculate the balance of power between the state and fed-
eral government in order to protect the environment and the citi-
 
 235 See, e.g., Patricia Salkin, Cooperative Federalism and Climate Change: New Meaning 
to “Think Globally—Act Locally,” 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10562 (2010).  Pro-
fessor Salkin provides examples for recommendations to federal and state govern-
ments “to ensure that local governments have the tools, resources, authority, and 
support needed” to address the root causes of greenhouse gases and implement na-
tional policies for dealing with them.  Id. at 10570–71. 
 236 Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement 
of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1697–98 (2001).  Professor Weiser argues 
that lack of unified vision for the singular roles of federal regulatory agencies, state 
government, and federal judges has resulted in a failure to properly implement the 
cooperative federalism ideals set out in recent federal statutes.  Id. at 1692–93. 
Cooperative federalism regulatory programs, which combine federal 
and state authority in creative ways, strike many courts and commenta-
tors as a messy and chaotic means of generating federal law. Com-
pounding the hostility to such regimes, some argue that globalization 
and technological change leave little or no role for states in imple-
menting complex regulatory regimes and thus endorse a “preemptive 
federalism” that relies primarily or exclusively on federal courts or ad-
ministrative agencies to develop unitary and pinpointed federal poli-
cies. 
Id. at 1693. 
 237 See supra notes 208–19 and accompanying text. 
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zens’ and commercial interests, not to spread liability and avoid ac-
countability.  The natural gas industry does not need to submit more 
paperwork that overworked federal employees will process and that 
will never reach state officials.  Instead, the industry needs a clear set 
of authorities that force it to answer for any negligent practices or 
failed innovations. 
The protection of groundwater must not be subordinate to the 
development of natural gas.  But neither should the resources lying 
beneath the surface of the affected states be put into indefinite stasis.  
The best option should be more creative than a hastily-concocted 
moratorium that merely panders to the fears of an elected official’s 
base.  The EPA needs more time to study the actual effects of hydrau-
lic fracturing chemicals on groundwater.  Accordingly, states should 
avoid shutting down the industry due to lack of publicly available 
studies.  States have other options to explore, such as instituting a 
staggered system of permitted activity that allows the industry to frack 
wells in low-risk geographical areas, but does not allow hydraulic frac-
turing in areas where the chemicals would present greater risks.  A 
model of regulation drawn from modified principles of cooperative 
federalism would allow the EPA to produce a sufficiently comprehen-
sive investigation of the inherent risks of hydraulic fracturing while 
avoiding damage to the industry. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Comment draws from the mechanical process of hydraulic 
fracturing and current state regulations to provide historical context 
for the EPA’s forthcoming study.  There are already federal statutes 
that regulate parts of the hydraulic fracturing process as well as gaps 
in the regulatory scheme, which the FRAC Act is intended to fill.  Sci-
ence and politics are dynamic forces shaping the format of the study.  
Recent failures in both federal and state agencies’ accountability and 
ability to respond to disasters, as seen in the BP blowout, demonstrate 
the danger when poorly designated authority results in catastrophic 
breakdowns where federal and state powers overlap. 
Under the SDWA, the EPA possesses the authority to set national 
policy goals for individual states to implement UIC programs.
238
  Prac-
tical application of cooperative federalism in this context would re-
quire the EPA to implement a federal solution only when states show 
that they are incapable of maintaining adequately a regulatory pro-
 
 238 See supra Part III.C.1. 
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gram.  The balance of competing interests—the need for sources of 
energy and the need to protect our water resources—calls for a re-
spectful solution; solution that does not smother an industry while 
providing necessary resources for our consumption,
239
 but which also 
protects our most vital resource.  A partnership can develop between 
state and federal governments where the federal government pro-
vides uniform science and a minimum standard to calm individual 
concerns, but leaves room for more stringent or specific regulation to 
local government sources.  This cooperation will provide the most 
comprehensive, protective, and accountable regulation of the natural 
gas industry, while preserving a balance between the competing in-
terests. 
 
 
 239 An IHS Global Insight study found that federal regulation would reduce gas 
production by 4.4 Tcf, or twenty-two percent, and reduce oil production by 400,000 
b/d, or eight percent, by 2014.  IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, MEASURING THE ECONOMIC AND 
ENERGY PROPOSALS TO REGULATE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 1–2 (2009), available at 
http://www.api.org/policy/exploration/hydraulicfracturing/upload/IHS_GI_Hydra
ulic_Fracturing_Exec_Summary.pdf.  
